Author Archives: Igor Koršič

Poziv društva pisateljev za begunce

Spoštovani predsedniki vlade, države in državnega zbora, spoštovani slovenski politiki!

V imenu človečnosti in humanosti, v imenu najvišjih etičnih in moralnih standardov, v imenu pravičnosti, enakosti in bratstva, v imenu spoštovanja življenja in njegove svetosti vas pisateljice in pisatelji slovenske države, kot svobodni državljani sveta, pozivamo in prosimo:

da prenehate s kakršno koli, tudi najmanjšo retoriko leporečja in demagogije v zvezi z žgočo begunsko problematiko in sprejemom beguncev, da prenehate operirati s kvotami in številkami, s preštevanji, ki na kakršen koli način omejujejo človekovo svobodo in dostojanstvo. Zgodovina nas uči, da so posledice tovrstnih preštevanj veliko dražje in dolgotrajnejše, kot je videti na prvi pogled.

da se prenehate sklicevati na schengenske in dublinske sporazume, saj se zdaj med največjim eksodusom po drugi svetovni vojni jasno kaže, da so izraz diskriminacijske politike trdnjave Evrope, na kar so evropske nevladne organizacije opozarjale že od njihovih nastankov. Trdnjava Evropa je zagrešila gradnjo novih ograj in zidov na svojih mejah, čeprav še ni minilo niti četrt stoletja od padca Berlinskega zidu. Vendar valov preganjanih in brezpravnih, obupanih brezdomnih, ki imajo le še svoja življenja, ne bo ustavil noben še tako visok zid, pa naj se imenuje tako ali drugače.

da migrantsko politiko rešujete sistemsko, bolj sistematično in preudarno kot doslej ter v kar najboljšem sodelovanju z nevladnimi organizacijami, ki že od nekdaj zagovarjajo strpnejšo in pravičnejšo begunsko, azilantsko in imigrantsko politiko, saj se pomembnosti njenega reševanja zavedajo dosti bolj kot nacionalne države. Slovenija ima dovolj blagovnih rezerv in nastanitvenih zmogljivosti. Vse sosede (razen Madžarske) so nam pri tem lahko za zgled.

časa za ureditev begunske, azilantske in kakršne koli migrantske politike je imela Evropa in Slovenija več kot dovolj! Vendar je bila evropska politika s svojo neoliberalno in neokapitalistično politično logiko doslej uspešnejša pri asistiranju npr. Združenim državam Amerike pri destabilizaciji Bližnjega vzhoda, Iraka, Afganistana ter afriške celine kot pri reševanju problemov v tem delu sveta. Posledice zgrešenih, impotentnih politik so krize, socialna nestabilnost in vojne tako znotraj Evrope kot zunaj nje. Posledice plenjenj in dopuščanja ali celo vzpodbujanja vojn pa so begunci. Najbogatejše in najbolj razvite države kujejo največje dobičke s prodajo orožja. Temu je treba narediti konec!

nikar ne poudarjajte naše (slovenske) majhnosti, medtem ko rešujete begunsko in azilantsko vprašanje, ne podcenjujte svojih državljanov in naših sposobnosti ter talentov. Niti v zvezi z begunci! Državljani Slovenije so že prevečkrat dokazali humanost in empatijo v pomoči ogroženim, revnim in brezpravnim, medtem ko je prav opevana samostojna država vse prevečkrat zatajila.

ne sklicujte se na »pozitivne rezultate« in izkušnje iz nedavnih balkanskih vojn, saj je Slovenija kot država ob sprejemu bosanskih pregnancev zagrešila preveč napak. Da se ne bi ponovile, je vredno spomin nanje kdaj tudi obnoviti. Poleti l. 1992 je slovenska država zaprla meje za pregnance iz bosanske vojne, česar ni naredila nobena od naših sosed. Z izgovorom, da jih ne more sprejeti več kot 70.000. Naknadno preštevanje na zahtevo takratnih nevladnih organizacij je pokazalo, da je bilo njihovo število za polovico manjše. Torej beguncev iz Bosne in Hrvaške nikoli ni bilo veliko več kot 30.000. Pregnance iz vojne, še do včeraj skoraj brate in sestre, je naša država za nekaj mesecev zaprla za zidove zbirnih centrov in jim je še dolgo potem omejevala svobodo gibanja, le enkrat tedensko so lahko šli ven. Ne pozabimo tega! Niti sramotne politike do izbrisanih! Imejte, spoštovani slovenski politiki, vse te napake zdaj, ob prihodu novih beguncev, še bolj pred očmi. Zato, da boste lahko ravnali ustrezneje, odgovorneje in bolj humano, kot so tisti pred vami. Da ne bodo morali levjega deleža odgovornosti na svoja pleča, kot že prevečkrat, prevzemati celo najbolj obubožani državljani te države.

– prav zaradi dosedanjih zgrešenih politik bi bilo morda bolje, vsekakor pa bolj humano, že vnaprej načrtovati večjo integracijo in ne le tranzita beguncev skozi našo državo.

Nič narobe ne bi bilo, če bi svoje globoke denarnice, tudi tiste v davčnih oazah, odprli najbogatejši državljani Slovenije in si malo očistili vest, če že sodelujejo pri neoliberalnem plenjenju sveta, ki posledično vpliva na njegovo vse večjo nestabilnost in iztirjenost. Tudi na to lahko vplivate, spoštovani slovenski politiki.

Zgolj usoda je hotela, da smo rojeni v najbogatejšem delu sveta. Le usoda je hotela, da se ne utapljamo v prenatrpanih gumijastih čolnih v Sredozemlju, da po evropskih pešpoteh ne bežimo kot preganjane živali, da ne nosimo vsega svojega imetja v plastičnih vrečkah ali nahrbtnikih, da nam ni treba kot narod prositi za miloščino drugih narodov. Ne vemo pa, kaj nas še čaka. Spomnimo se, da se je nekaj podobnega še ne tako dolgo nazaj dogajalo našim prednikom. Težjega trenutka, kot je zdaj, Evropa ni doživela od II. svetovne vojne, razen vojne v nekdanji Jugoslaviji in v Ukrajini, ko se prav tako nikakor ni izkazala. Kdo ve, če ni zdaj na popravnem izpitu. Zadnjem. Popravnem izpitu iz strpnosti, sodelovanja, iz empatije in humanosti, etike in zdrave morale.

V eno smer zdaj pljuskajo valovi beguncev skozi Evropo. Če jih ne bomo sproti sprejemali in jim dolgoročno zagotovili pomoči, jih bo ulovil val ksenofobije in fašizma, ki se širi, zaenkrat sicer še počasi, a vztrajno, in jih bo začel ne le porivati nazaj pod krogle krvnikov, ampak ubijati kar na tleh demokratične Evrope.

 

Ljubljana, 8. september 2015                                      

Društvo slovenskih pisateljev

Kaj je ISIS?

The Mystery of ISIS

by Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan

The author has wide experience in the Middle East and was formerly an official of a NATO country. We respect the writer’s reasons for anonymity.
—The Editors (The New York Review of  Books)

 

Ahmad Fadhil was eighteen when his father died in 1984. Photographs suggest that he was relatively short, chubby, and wore large glasses. He wasn’t a particularly poor student—he received a B grade in junior high—but he decided to leave school. There was work in the garment and leather factories in his home city of Zarqa, Jordan, but he chose instead to work in a video store, and earned enough money to pay for some tattoos. He also drank alcohol, took drugs, and got into trouble with the police. So his mother sent him to an Islamic self-help class. This sobered him up and put him on a different path. By the time Ahmad Fadhil died in 2006 he had laid the foundations of an independent Islamic state of eight million people that controlled a territory larger than Jordan itself.

The rise of Ahmad Fadhil—or as he was later known in the jihad, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—and ISIS, the movement of which he was the founder, remains almost inexplicable. The year 2003, in which he began his operations in Iraq, seemed to many part of a mundane and unheroic age of Internet start-ups and a slowly expanding system of global trade. Despite the US-led invasion of Iraq that year, the borders of Syria and Iraq were stable. Secular Arab nationalism appeared to have triumphed over the older forces of tribe and religion. Different religious communities—Yezidis, Shabaks, Christians, Kaka’is, Shias, and Sunnis—continued to live alongside one another, as they had for a millennium or more. Iraqis and Syrians had better incomes, education, health systems, and infrastructure, and an apparently more positive future, than most citizens of the developing world. Who then could have imagined that a movement founded by a man from a video store in provincial Jordan would tear off a third of the territory of Syria and Iraq, shatter all these historical institutions, and—defeating the combined militaries of a dozen of the wealthiest countries on earth—create a mini empire?
The story is relatively easy to narrate, but much more difficult to understand. It begins in 1989, when Zarqawi, inspired by his Islamic self-help class, traveled from Jordan to “do jihad” in Afghanistan. Over the next decade he fought in the Afghan civil war, organized terrorist attacks in Jordan, spent years in a Jordanian jail, and returned—with al-Qaeda help—to set up a training camp in Herat in western Afghanistan. He was driven out of Afghanistan by the US-led invasion of 2001, but helped back onto his feet by the Iranian government. Then, in 2003—with the assistance of Saddam loyalists—he set up an insurgency network in Iraq. By targeting Shias and their most holy sites, he was able to turn an insurgency against US troops into a Shia–Sunni civil war.

Zarqawi was killed by a US air strike in 2006. But his movement improbably survived the full force of the 170,000-strong, $100 billion a year US troop surge. In 2011, after the US withdrawal, the new leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, expanded into Syria and reestablished a presence in northwest Iraq. In June 2014 the movement took Mosul—Iraq’s second-largest city—and in May 2015 the Iraqi city of Ramadi and the Syrian city of Palmyra, and its affiliates took the airport in Sirte, Libya. Today, thirty countries, including Nigeria, Libya, and the Philippines, have groups that claim to be part of the movement.

Although the movement has changed its name seven times and has had four leaders, it continues to treat Zarqawi as its founder, and to propagate most of his original beliefs and techniques of terror. The New York Times refers to it as “the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL.” Zarqawi also called it “Army of the Levant,” “Monotheism and Jihad,” “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” and “Mujihadeen Shura Council.” (A movement known for its marketing has rarely cared about consistent branding.) I will simplify the many changes of name and leadership by referring to it throughout as “ISIS,” although it has of course evolved during its fifteen years of existence.

The problem, however, lies not in chronicling the successes of the movement, but in explaining how something so improbable became possible. The explanations so often given for its rise—the anger of Sunni communities, the logistical support provided by other states and groups, the movement’s social media campaigns, its leadership, its tactics, its governance, its revenue streams, and its ability to attract tens of thousands of foreign fighters—fall far short of a convincing theory of the movement’s success.

Emma Sky’s book The Unraveling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq,1 for example, a deft, nuanced, and often funny account of her years as a civilian official in Iraq between 2003 and 2010, illustrates the mounting Sunni anger in Iraq. She shows how US policies such as de-Baathification in 2003 began the alienation of Sunnis, and how this was exacerbated by the atrocities committed by Shia militias in 2006 (fifty bodies a day were left on the streets of Baghdad, killed by power drills inserted in their skulls). She explains the often imaginative steps that were taken to regain the trust of the Sunni communities during the surge of 2007, and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s alienation of those communities again after the US withdrawal in 2011 through his imprisonment of Sunni leaders, his discrimination and brutality, and the disbanding of Sunni militias.

But many other insurgent groups, quite different from ISIS, often seemed to have been in a much stronger position to have become the dominant vehicles of “Sunni anger.” Sunnis in Iraq initially had minimal sympathy with Zarqawi’s death cult and with his movement’s imposition of early medieval social codes. Most were horrified when Zarqawi blew up the UN headquarters in Baghdad; when he released a film in which he personally sawed off the head of an American civilian; when he blew up the great Shia shrine at Samarra and killed hundreds of Iraqi children. After he mounted three simultaneous bomb attacks against Jordanian hotels—killing sixty civilians at a wedding party—the senior leaders of his Jordanian tribe and his own brother signed a public letter disowning him. The Guardian was only echoing the conventional wisdom when it concluded in Zarqawi’s obituary: “Ultimately, his brutality tarnished any aura, offered little but nihilism and repelled Muslims worldwide.”

Other insurgent groups also often seemed more effective. In 2003, for example, secular Baathists were more numerous, better equipped, better organized, and more experienced military commanders; in 2009, the militia of the “Sunni Awakening” had much better resources and its armed movement was more deeply rooted locally. In 2011, the Free Syrian Army, including former officers of the Assad regime, was a much more plausible leader of resistance in Syria; and so in 2013 was the more extremist militia Jabhat-al-Nusra. Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss show in ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, for example, that al-Nusra formed far closer links to tribal groups in East Syria—even marrying its fighters to tribal women.

Such groups have sometimes blamed their collapse and lack of success, and ISIS’s rise, on lack of resources. The Free Syrian Army, for example has long insisted that it would have been able to supplant ISIS if its leaders had received more money and weapons from foreign states. And the Sunni Awakening leaders in Iraq argue that they lost control of their communities only because the Baghdad government ceased to pay their salaries. But there is no evidence that ISIS initially received more cash or guns than these groups; rather the reverse.

Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss’s account suggests that much of the early support for the ISIS movement was limited because it was inspired by ideologues who themselves despised Zarqawi and his followers. The al-Qaeda cash that launched Zarqawi in 1999, for example, was, in their words, “a pittance compared to what al-Qaeda was financially capable of disbursing.” The fact that it didn’t give him more reflected bin Laden’s horror at Zarqawi’s killing of Shias (bin Laden’s mother was Shia) and his distaste for Zarqawi’s tattoos.

Although the Iranians gave Zarqawi medical aid and safe haven when he was a fugitive in 2002, he soon lost their sympathy by sending his own father-in-law in a suicide vest to kill Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim, Iran’s senior political representative in Iraq, and by blowing up one of the most sacred Shia shrines. And although ISIS has relied for more than a decade on the technical skills of the Baathists and the Sufi Iraqi general Izzat al-Douri, who controlled an underground Baathist militia after the fall of Saddam, this relationship has been strained. (The movement makes no secret of its contempt for Sufism, its destruction of Sufi shrines, or its abhorrence of everything that Baathist secular Arab nationalists espouse.)

Nor has the leadership of ISIS been particularly attractive, high-minded, or competent—although some allowance should be made for the understandable revulsion of the biographers. Mary-Anne Weaver, in a 2006 Atlantic article, describes Zarqawi as “barely literate,” “a bully and a thug, a bootlegger and a heavy drinker, and even, allegedly, a pimp.” Weiss and Hassan call him an “intellectual lightweight.” Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger in ISIS: The State of Terror say this “thug-turned-terrorist” and “mediocre student…arrived in Afghanistan as a zero.” Weaver describes his “botched operation[s]” in Jordan and his use of a “hapless would-be bomber.” Stern and Berger explain that bin Laden and his followers did not like him because they “were mostly members of an intellectual educated elite, while Zarqawi was a barely educated ruffian with an attitude.”

If writers have much less to say about the current leader, al-Baghdadi, this is because his biography, as Weiss and Hassan concede, “still hovers not far above the level of rumor or speculation, some of it driven, in fact, by competing jihadist propagandists.”

Nor is ISIS’s distinctive approach to insurgency—from holding territory to fighting regular armies—an obvious advantage. Lawrence of Arabia advised that insurgents must be like a mist—everywhere and nowhere—never trying to hold ground or wasting lives in battles with regular armies. Chairman Mao insisted that guerrillas should be fish who swam in the sea of the local population. Such views are the logical corollaries of “asymmetric warfare” in which a smaller, apparently weaker group—like ISIS—confronts a powerful adversary such as the US and Iraqi militaries. This is confirmed by US Army studies of more than forty historical insurgencies, which suggest again and again that holding ground, fighting pitched battles, and alienating the cultural and religious sensibilities of the local population are fatal.

But such tactics are exactly part of ISIS’s explicit strategy. Zarqawi lost thousands of fighters trying to hold Fallujah in 2004. He wasted the lives of his suicide bombers in constant small attacks and—by imposing the most draconian punishments and obscurantist social codes—outraged the Sunni communities that he claimed to represent. ISIS fighters are now clearly attracted by the movement’s ability to control territory in such places as Mosul—as an interview in Yalda Hakim’s recent BBC documentary Mosul: Living with Islamic State confirms. But it is not clear that this tactic—although alluring, and at the moment associated with success—has become any less risky.

anonymous_2-081315.jpg
Reuters
A still from the video released by ISIS on April 19, which appears to show the execution of Ethiopian Christians by members of Wilayat Fazzan, another affiliate of ISIS, in southern Libya
The movement’s behavior, however, has not become less reckless or tactically bizarre since Zarqawi’s death. One US estimate by Larry Schweikart suggested that 40,000 insurgents had been killed, about 200,000 wounded, and 20,000 captured before the US even launched the surge in 2006. By June 2010, General Ray Odierno claimed that 80 percent of the movement’s top forty-two leaders had been killed or captured, with only eight remaining at large. But after the US left in 2011, instead of rebuilding its networks in Iraq, the battered remnants chose to launch an invasion of Syria, and took on not just the regime, but also the well-established Free Syrian Army. It attacked the movement’s Syrian branch—Jabhat-al-Nusra—when it broke away. It enraged al-Qaeda in 2014 by killing al-Qaeda’s senior emissary in the region. It deliberately provoked tens of thousands of Shia militiamen to join the fight on the side of the Syrian regime, and then challenged the Iranian Quds force by advancing on Baghdad.

Next, already struggling against these new enemies, the movement opened another front in August 2014 by attacking Kurdistan, driving the Kurdish forces—who had hitherto stayed out of the battle—to retaliate. It beheaded the American journalist James Foley and the British aid worker David Haines, thereby bringing in the US and UK. It enraged Japan by demanding hundreds of millions of dollars for a hostage who was already dead. It finished 2014 by mounting a suicidal attack on Kobane in Syria, in the face of over six hundred US air strikes, losing many thousands of ISIS fighters and gaining no ground. When, as recently as April, the movement lost Tikrit and seemed to be declining, the explanation appeared obvious. Analysts were on the verge of concluding that ISIS had lost because it was reckless, abhorrent, over-extended, fighting on too many fronts, with no real local support, unable to translate terrorism into a popular program, inevitably outmatched by regular armies.

Some analysts have, therefore, focused their explanations not on the movement’s often apparently self-defeating military strategy, but on its governance and revenue, its support from the population, and its reliance on tens of thousands of foreign fighters. Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, a fellow of the Middle East Forum, has explained in recent blog posts how in some occupied cities such as Raqqa in Syria, the movement has created complicated civil service structures, taking control even of municipal waste departments. He describes the revenue it derives from local income and property taxes, and by leasing out former Iraqi and Syrian state offices to businesses. He shows how this has given ISIS a broad and reliable income base, which is only supplemented by the oil smuggling and the antiquity looting so well described by Nicolas Pelham in these pages.2

ISIS’s power is now reinforced by the staggering arsenal that the movement has taken from the fleeing Iraqi and Syrian army—including tanks, Humvees, and major artillery pieces. Reports from The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Reuters, and Vice News over the last twelve months have shown that many Sunnis in Iraq and Syria now feel that ISIS is the only plausible guarantor of order and security in the civil war, and their only defense against brutal retribution from the Damascus and Baghdad governments.

But here too the evidence is confusing and contradictory. Yalda Hakim’s BBC documentary on Mosul makes rough brutality the secret of ISIS’s domination. In his book The Digital Caliphate, Abdel Bari Atwan, however, describes (in Malise Ruthven’s words) “a well-run organization that combines bureaucratic efficiency and military expertise with a sophisticated use of information technology.”3 Zaid Al-Ali, in his excellent account of Tikrit, talks about ISIS’s “incapacity to govern” and the total collapse of water supply, electricity, and schools, and ultimately population under its rule.4 “Explanations” that refer to resources and power are ultimately circular. The fact that the movement has been able to attract the apparent support, or acquiescence, of the local population, and control territory, local government revenue, oil, historical sites, and military bases, has been a result of the movement’s success and its monopoly of the insurgency. It is not a cause of it.

In ISIS: The State of Terror, Stern and Berger provide a fascinating analysis of the movement’s use of video and social media. They have tracked individual Twitter accounts, showing how users kept changing their Twitter handles, piggybacked on the World Cup by inserting images of beheadings into the soccer chat, and created new apps and automated bots to boost their numbers. Stern and Berger show that at least 45,000 pro-movement accounts were online in late 2014, and describe how their users attempted to circumvent Twitter administrators by changing their profile pictures from the movement’s flags to kittens. But this simply raises the more fundamental question of why the movement’s ideology and actions—however slickly produced and communicated—have had popular appeal in the first place.

Nor have there been any more satisfying explanations of what draws the 20,000 foreign fighters who have joined the movement. At first, the large number who came from Britain were blamed on the British government having made insufficient effort to assimilate immigrant communities; then France’s were blamed on the government pushing too hard for assimilation. But in truth, these new foreign fighters seemed to sprout from every conceivable political or economic system. They came from very poor countries (Yemen and Afghanistan) and from the wealthiest countries in the world (Norway and Qatar). Analysts who have argued that foreign fighters are created by social exclusion, poverty, or inequality should acknowledge that they emerge as much from the social democracies of Scandinavia as from monarchies (a thousand from Morocco), military states (Egypt), authoritarian democracies (Turkey), and liberal democracies (Canada). It didn’t seem to matter whether a government had freed thousands of Islamists (Iraq), or locked them up (Egypt), whether it refused to allow an Islamist party to win an election (Algeria) or allowed an Islamist party to be elected. Tunisia, which had the most successful transition from the Arab Spring to an elected Islamist government, nevertheless produced more foreign fighters than any other country.

Nor was the surge in foreign fighters driven by some recent change in domestic politics or in Islam. Nothing fundamental had shifted in the background of culture or religious belief between 2012, when there were almost none of these foreign fighters in Iraq, and 2014, when there were 20,000. The only change is that there was suddenly a territory available to attract and house them. If the movement had not seized Raqqa and Mosul, many of these men might well have simply continued to live out their lives with varying degrees of strain—as Normandy dairy farmers or council employees in Cardiff. We are left again with tautology—ISIS exists because it can exist—they are there because they’re there.

Finally, a year ago, it seemed plausible to attach much of the blame for the rise of the movement to former Iraqi prime minister al-Maliki’s disastrous administration of Iraq. No longer. Over the last year, a new, more constructive, moderate, and inclusive leader, Haider al-Abadi, has been appointed prime minister; the Iraqi army has been restructured under a new Sunni minister of defense; the old generals have been removed; and foreign governments have competed to provide equipment and training. Some three thousand US advisers and trainers have appeared in Iraq. Formidable air strikes and detailed surveillance have been provided by the United States, the United Kingdom, and others. The Iranian Quds force, the Gulf states, and the Kurdish Peshmerga have joined the fight on the ground.

For all these reasons the movement was expected to be driven back and lose Mosul in 2015. Instead, in May, it captured Palmyra in Syria and—almost simultaneously—Ramadi, three hundred miles away in Iraq. In Ramadi, three hundred ISIS fighters drove out thousands of trained and heavily equipped Iraqi soldiers. The US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter observed:

The Iraqi forces just showed no will to fight. They were not outnumbered. In fact, they vastly outnumbered the opposing force, and yet they failed to fight.
The movement now controls a “terrorist state” far more extensive and far more developed than anything that George W. Bush evoked at the height of the “Global War on Terror.” Then, the possibility of Sunni extremists taking over the Iraqi province of Anbar was used to justify a surge of 170,000 US troops and the expenditure of over $100 billion a year. Now, years after the surge, ISIS controls not only Anbar, but also Mosul and half of the territory of Syria. Its affiliates control large swaths of northern Nigeria and significant areas of Libya. Hundreds of thousands have now been killed and millions displaced; horrors unimaginable even to the Taliban—among them the reintroduction of forcible rape of minors and slavery—have been legitimized. And this catastrophe has not only dissolved the borders between Syria and Iraq, but provoked the forces that now fight the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen.

The clearest evidence that we do not understand this phenomenon is our consistent inability to predict—still less control—these developments. Who predicted that Zarqawi would grow in strength after the US destroyed his training camps in 2001? It seemed unlikely to almost everyone that the movement would regroup so quickly after his death in 2006, or again after the surge in 2007. We now know more and more facts about the movement and its members, but this did not prevent most analysts from believing as recently as two months ago that the defeats in Kobane and Tikrit had tipped the scales against the movement, and that it was unlikely to take Ramadi. We are missing something.

Part of the problem may be that commentators still prefer to focus on political, financial, and physical explanations, such as anti-Sunni discrimination, corruption, lack of government services in captured territories, and ISIS’s use of violence. Western audiences are, therefore, rarely forced to focus on ISIS’s bewildering ideological appeal. I was surprised when I saw that even a Syrian opponent of ISIS was deeply moved by a video showing how ISIS destroyed the “Sykes-Picot border” between Iraq and Syria, established since 1916, and how it went on to reunite divided tribes. I was intrigued by the condemnation issued by Ahmed al-Tayeb, the grand imam of al-Azhar—one of the most revered Sunni clerics in the world: “This group is Satanic—they should have their limbs amputated or they should be crucified.” I was taken aback by bin Laden’s elegy for Zarqawi: his “story will live forever with the stories of the nobles…. Even if we lost one of our greatest knights and princes, we are happy that we have found a symbol….”

But the “ideology” of ISIS is also an insufficient explanation. Al-Qaeda understood better than anyone the peculiar blend of Koranic verses, Arab nationalism, crusader history, poetic reference, sentimentalism, and horror that can animate and sustain such movements. But even its leaders thought that Zarqawi’s particular approach was irrational, culturally inappropriate, and unappealing. In 2005, for example, al-Qaeda leaders sent messages advising Zarqawi to stop publicizing his horrors. They used modern strategy jargon—“more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media”—and told him that the “lesson” of Afghanistan was that the Taliban had lost because they had relied—like Zarqawi—on too narrow a sectarian base. And the al-Qaeda leaders were not the only Salafi jihadists who assumed that their core supporters preferred serious religious teachings to snuff videos (just as al-Tayeb apparently assumed that an Islamist movement would not burn a Sunni Arab pilot alive in a cage).

Much of what ISIS has done clearly contradicts the moral intuitions and principles of many of its supporters. And we sense—through Hassan Hassan and Michael Weiss’s careful interviews—that its supporters are at least partially aware of this contradiction. Again, we can list the different external groups that have provided funding and support to ISIS. But there are no logical connections of ideology, identity, or interests that should link Iran, the Taliban, and the Baathists to one another or to ISIS. Rather, each case suggests that institutions that are starkly divided in theology, politics, and culture perpetually improvise lethal and even self-defeating partnerships of convenience.

The thinkers, tacticians, soldiers, and leaders of the movement we know as ISIS are not great strategists; their policies are often haphazard, reckless, even preposterous; regardless of whether their government is, as some argue, skillful, or as others imply, hapless, it is not delivering genuine economic growth or sustainable social justice. The theology, principles, and ethics of the ISIS leaders are neither robust nor defensible. Our analytical spade hits bedrock very fast.

I have often been tempted to argue that we simply need more and better information. But that is to underestimate the alien and bewildering nature of this phenomenon. To take only one example, five years ago not even the most austere Salafi theorists advocated the reintroduction of slavery; but ISIS has in fact imposed it. Nothing since the triumph of the Vandals in Roman North Africa has seemed so sudden, incomprehensible, and difficult to reverse as the rise of ISIS. None of our analysts, soldiers, diplomats, intelligence officers, politicians, or journalists has yet produced an explanation rich enough—even in hindsight—to have predicted the movement’s rise.

We hide this from ourselves with theories and concepts that do not bear deep examination. And we will not remedy this simply through the accumulation of more facts. It is not clear whether our culture can ever develop sufficient knowledge, rigor, imagination, and humility to grasp the phenomenon of ISIS. But for now, we should admit that we are not only horrified but baffled.

1
PublicAffairs, 2015. ↩

2
See “ ISIS and the Shia Revival in Iraq,” The New York Review, June 4, 2015. ↩

3
See “ Inside the Islamic State,” The New York Review, July 9, 2015. ↩

4
See “ Tikrit: Iraq’s Abandoned City,” NYRblog, May 4, 2015. ↩

Integralni Varufakisov intervju v New Statesmanu

Yanis Varoufakis full transcript: our battle to save Greece

The full transcript of the former Greek Finance Minister’s first interview since resigning.

Yanis Varoufakis feels “on top of the world” now his part in the crisis talks is over. Photo: Getty

Read the report from Greece of our interview with Varoufakis here.

This conversation took place before the deal.

Harry Lambert: So how are you feeling?

Yanis Varoufakis: I’m feeling on top of the world – I no longer have to live through this hectic timetable, which was absolutely inhuman, just unbelievable. I was on 2 hours sleep every day for five months. … I’m also relieved I don’t have to sustain any longer this incredible pressure to negotiate for a position I find difficult to defend, even if I managed to force the other side to acquiesce, if you know what I mean.

 

HL: What was it like? Did you like any aspect of it?

YV: Oh well a lot of it. But the inside information one gets… to have your worst fears confirmed … To have “the powers that be” speak to you directly, and it be as you feared – the situation was worse than you imagined! So that was fun, to have the front row seat.

 

HL: What are you referring to?

YV: The complete lack of any democratic scruples, on behalf of the supposed defenders of Europe’s democracy. The quite clear understanding on the other side that we are on the same page analytically – of course it will never come out at present. [And yet] To have very powerful figures look at you in the eye and say “You’re right in what you’re saying, but we’re going to crunch you anyway.”

 

HL: You’ve said creditors objected to you because “I try and talk economics in the Eurogroup, which nobody does.” What happened when you did?

YV: It’s not that it didn’t go down well – it’s that there was point blank refusal to engage in economic arguments. Point blank. … You put forward an argument that you’ve really worked on – to make sure it’s logically coherent – and you’re just faced with blank stares. It is as if you haven’t spoken. What you say is independent of what they say. You might as well have sung the Swedish national anthem – you’d have got the same reply. And that’s startling, for somebody who’s used to academic debate. … The other side always engages. Well there was no engagement at all. It was not even annoyance, it was as if one had not spoken.

 

HL: When you first arrived, in early February, this can’t have been a unified position?

YV: Well there were people who were sympathetic at a personal level – so, you know, behind closed doors, on an informal basis, especially from the IMF. [HL: “From the highest levels?” YV: “From the highest levels, from the highest levels.”] But then inside the Eurogroup, a few kind words and that’s it, back behind the parapet of the official version.

[But] Schäuble was consistent throughout. His view was “I’m not discussing the programme – this was accepted by the previous government and we can’t possibly allow an election to change anything. Because we have elections all the time, there are 19 of us, if every time there was an election and something changed, the contracts between us wouldn’t mean anything.”

So at that point I had to get up and say “Well perhaps we should simply not hold elections anymore for indebted countries”, and there was no answer. The only interpretation I can give [of their view] is “Yes, that would be a good idea, but it would be difficult to do. So you either sign on the dotted line or you are out.”

 

HL: And Merkel?

YV: You have to understand I never had anything to do with Merkel, finance ministers talk to finance ministers, prime ministers talk to Chancellors. From my understanding, she was very different.  She tried to placate the Prime Minister [Tsipras] – she said “We’ll find a solution, don’t worry about it, I won’t let anything awful happen, just do your homework and work with the institutions, work with the Troika; there can be no dead end here.”

This is not what I heard from my counterpart – both from the head of the Eurogroup and Dr Schäuble, they were very clear. At some point it was put to me very unequivocally: “This is a horse and either you get on it or it is dead.”

 

HL: Right so when was that?

YV: From the beginning, from the very beginning. [They first met in early February.]

 

HL: So why hang around until the summer?

YV: Well one doesn’t have an alternative. Our government was elected with a mandate to negotiate. So our first mandate was to create the space and time to have a negotiation and reach another agreement. That was our mandate – our mandate was to negotiate, it was not to come to blows with our creditors. …

The negotiations took ages, because the other side was refusing to negotiate. They insisted on a “comprehensive agreement”, which meant they wanted to talk about everything. My interpretation is that when you want to talk about everything, you don’t want to talk about anything. But we went along with that.

And look there were absolutely no positions put forward on anything by them. So they would… let me give you an example. They would say we need all your data on the fiscal path on which Greek finds itself, we need all the data on state-owned enterprises. So we spent a lot of time trying to provide them with all the data and answering questionnaires and having countless meetings providing the data.

So that would be the first phase. The second phase was where they’d ask us what we intended to do on VAT. They would then reject our proposal but wouldn’t come up with a proposal of their own. And then, before we would get a chance to agree on VAT with them, they would shift to another issue, like privatisation. They would ask what we want to do about privatisation, we put something forward, they would reject it. Then they’d move onto another topic, like pensions, from there to product markets, from there to labour relations, from labour relations to all sorts of things right? So it was like a cat chasing its own tail.

We felt, the government felt, that we couldn’t discontinue the process. Look, my suggestion from the beginning was this: This is a country that has run aground, that ran aground a long time ago. … Surely we need to reform this country – we are in agreement on this. Because time is of the essence, and because during negotiations the central bank was squeezing liquidity [on Greek banks] in order pressurise us, in order to succumb, my constant proposal to the Troika was very simple: let us agree on three or four important reforms that we agree upon, like the tax system, like VAT, and let’s implement them immediately. And you relax the restrictions on liqiuidity from the ECB. You want a comprehensive agreement – let’s carry on negotiating – and in the meantime let us introduce these reforms in parliament by agreement between us and you.

And they said “No, no, no, this has to be a comprehensive review. Nothing will be implemented if you dare introduce any legislation. It will be considered unilateral action inimical to the process of reaching an agreement.” And then of course a few months later they would leak to the media that we had not reformed the country and that we were wasting time! And so… [chuckles] we were set up, in a sense, in an important sense.

So by the time the liquidity almost ran out completely, and we were in default, or quasi-default, to the IMF, they introduced their proposals, which were absolutely impossible… totally non-viable and toxic. So they delayed and then came up with the kind of proposal you present to another side when you don’t want an agreement.

 

HL: Did you try working together with the governments of other indebted countries?

YV: The answer is no, and the reason is very simple: from the very beginning those particular countries made it abundantly clear that they were the most energetic enemies of our government, from the very beginning. And the reason of course was their greatest nightmare was our success: were we to succeed in negotiating a better deal for Greece, that would of course obliterate them politically, they would have to answer to their own people why they didn’t negotiate like we were doing.

 

HL: And partnering with sympathetic parties, like Podemos?

YV: Not really. I mean we always had a good relationship with them, but there was nothing they could do – their voice could never penetrate the Eurogroup. And indeed the more they spoke out in our favour, which they did, the more inimical the Finance Minister representing that country became towards us.

 

HL: And George Osborne? What were your dealings like with him?

YV: Oh very good, very pleasant, excellent. But he is out of the loop, he is not part of the Eurogroup. When I spoke to him on a number of occasions you could see that was very sympathetic. And indeed if you look at the Telegraph, the greatest supporters of our cause have been the Tories! Because of their Eurosceptism, eh… it’s not just Euroscepticsm; it’s a Burkean view of the sovereignty of parliament – in our case it was very clear that our parliament was being treated like rubbish.

 

HL: What is the greatest problem with the general way the Eurogroup functions?

YV: [To exemplify…] There was a moment when the President of the Eurogroup decided to move against us and effectively shut us out, and made it known that Greece was essentially on its way out of the Eurozone. … There is a convention that communiqués must be unanimous, and the President can’t just convene a meeting of the Eurozone and exclude a member state. And he said, “Oh I’m sure I can do that.” So I asked for a legal opinion. It created a bit of a kerfuffle. For about 5-10 minutes the meeting stopped, clerks, officials were talking to one another, on their phone, and eventually some official, some legal expert addressed me, and said the following words, that “Well, the Eurogroup does not exist in law, there is no treaty which has convened this group.”

So what we have is a non-existent group that has the greatest power to determine the lives of Europeans. It’s not answerable to anyone, given it doesn’t exist in law; no minutes are kept; and it’s confidential. So no citizen ever knows what is said within. … These are decisions of almost life and death, and no member has to answer to anybody.

 

HL: And is that group controlled by German attitudes?

YV: Oh completely and utterly. Not attitudes – by the finance minister of Germany. It is all like a very well-tuned orchestra and he is the director. Everything happens in tune. There will be times when the orchestra is out of tune, but he convenes and puts it back in line.

 

HL: Is there no alternative power within the group, can the French counter that power?

YV: Only the French finance minister has made noises that were different from the German line, and those noises were very subtle. You could sense he had to use very judicious language, to be seen not to oppose. And in the final analysis, when Doc Schäuble responded and effectively determined the official line, the French FM in the end would always fold and accept.

 

HL: Let’s talk about your theoretical background, and your piece on Marx in 2013, when you said:

“A Greek or a Portuguese or an Italian exit from the Eurozone would soon lead to a fragmentation of European capitalism, yielding a seriously recessionary surplus region east of the Rhine and north of the Alps, while the rest of Europe is would be in the grip of vicious stagflation. Who do you think would benefit from this development? A progressive left, that will rise Phoenix-like from the ashes of Europe’s public institutions? Or the Golden Dawn Nazis, the assorted neofascists, the xenophobes and the spivs? I have absolutely no doubt as to which of the two will do best from a disintegration of the eurozone.”

…so would a Grexit inevitably help Golden Dawn, do you still think that?

YV: Well, look, I don’t believe in deterministic versions of history. Syriza now is a very dominant force. If we manage to get out of this mess united, and handle properly a Grexit … it would be possible to have an alternative. But I’m not sure we would manage it, because managing the collapse of a monetary union takes a great deal of expertise, and I’m not sure we have it here in Greece without the help of outsiders.

 

HL: You must have been thinking about a Grexit from day one…

YV: Yes, absolutely.

 

HL: …have preparations been made?

YV: The answer is yes and no. We had a small group, a ‘war cabinet’ within the ministry, of about five people that were doing this: so we worked out in theory, on paper, everything that had to be done [to prepare for/in the event of a Grexit]. But it’s one thing to do that at the level of 4-5 people, it’s quite another to prepare the country for it. To prepare the country an executive decision had to be taken, and that decision was never taken.

 

HL: And in the past week, was that a decision you felt you were leaning towards [preparing for Grexit]?

YV: My view was, we should be very careful not to activate it. I didn’t want this to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. I didn’t want this to be like Nietzsche’s famous dictum that if you stare into the abyss long enough, the abyss will stare back at you. But I also believed that at the moment the Eurogroup shut out banks down, we should energise this process.

 

HL: Right. So there were two options as far as I can see – an immediate Grexit, or printing IOUs and taking bank control of the Bank of Greece [potentially but not necessarily precipitating a Grexit]?

YV: Sure, sure. I never believed we should go straight to a new currency. My view was – and I put this to the government – that if they dared shut our banks down, which I considered to be an aggressive move of incredible potency, we should respond aggressively but without crossing the point of no return.

We should issue our own IOUs, or even at least announce that we’re going to issue our own euro-denominated liquidity; we should haircut the Greek 2012 bonds that the ECB held, or announce we were going to do it; and we should take control of the Bank of Greece. This was the triptych, the three things, which I thought we should respond with if the ECB shut down our banks.

… I was warning the Cabinet this was going to happen [the ECB shut our banks] for a month, in order to drag us into a humiliating agreement. When it happened – and many of my colleagues couldn’t believe it happened – my recommendation for responding “energetically”, let’s say, was voted down.

 

HL: And how close was it to happening?

YV: Well let me say that out of six people we were in a minority of two. … Once it didn’t happen I got my orders to close down the banks consensually with the ECB and the Bank of Greece, which I was against, but I did because I’m a team player, I believe in collective responsibility.

And then the referendum happened, and the referendum gave us an amazing boost, one that would have justified this type of energetic response [his plan] against the ECB, but then that very night the government decided that the will of the people, this resounding ‘No’, should not be what energised the energetic approach [his plan].

Instead it should lead to major concessions to the other side: the meeting of the council of political leaders, with our Prime Minister accepting the premise that whatever happens, whatever the other side does, we will never respond in any way that challenges them. And essentially that means folding. … You cease to negotiate.

 

HL: So you can’t hold out much hope now, that this deal will be much better than last week’s – if anything it will be worse?

YV: If anything it will be worse. I trust and hope that our government will insist on debt restructuring, but I can’t see how the German finance minister is ever going to sign up to this in the forthcoming Eurogroup meeting. If he does, it will be a miracle.

 

HL: Exactly – because, as you’ve explained, your leverage is gone at this point?

YV: I think so, I think so. Unless he [Schäuble] gets his marching orders from the Chancellor. That remains to be seen, whether she will step in to do that.

 

HL: To come back out again, could you possibly explain, in layman’s terms for our readers, your objections to Piketty’s “Capital”?

YV: Well let me say firstly, I feel embarrassed because Piketty has been extremely supportive of me and the government, and I have been horrible to him in my review of his book! I really appreciate his position over the last few months, and I’m going to say this to him when I meet him in September.

But my criticism of his book stands. His sentiment is correct. His abhorrence of inequality… [inaudible]. His analysis, however, undermines the argument, as far as I am concerned. Because in his book the neoclassical model of capitalism gives very little room for building the case he wants to build up, except by building upon the model a very specific set of parameters, which undermines his own case. In other words, if I was an opponent of his thesis that inequality is built into capitalism, I would be able to take apart his case by attacking his analysis.

 

HL: I don’t want to get too detailed, because this isn’t going to make the final cut…

YV: Yes…

HL: …but it’s about his metric of wealth?

YV: Yes, he uses a definition of capital which makes capital impossible to understand – so it’s a contradiction of terms. [Click here—link to add: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2014/10/08/6006/—for Varoufakis’ critical review of Piketty’s Capital.]

 

HL: Let’s come back to the crisis. I really understand very little of your relationship with Tsipras…

YV: I’ve known him since late 2010, because I was a prominent critic of the government at the time, even though I was close to it once upon a time. I was close to the Papandreou family – I still am in a way – but I became prominent … back then it was big news that a former adviser was saying “We’re pretending bankruptcy didn’t happen, we’re trying to cover it up with new unsustainable loans,” that kind of thing.

I made some waves back then, and Tsipras was a very young leader trying to understand what was going on, what the crisis was about, and how he should position himself.

 

HL: Was there a first meeting you remember?

YV: Oh yes. It was late 2010, we went to a cafeteria, there were three of us, and my recollection is that he wasn’t clear back then what his views were, on the drachma versus the euro, on the causes of the crises, and I had very, well shall I say, “set views” on what was going on. And a dialogue begun which unfolded over the years and one that… I believe that I helped shape his view of what should be done.

 

HL: So how does it feel now, after four-and-a-half years, to no longer be working by his side?

YV: Well I don’t feel that way, I feel that we’re very close. Our parting was extremely amicable. We’ve never had a bad problem between us, never, not to this day. And I’m extremely close to Euclid Tsakalotos [the new finance minister].

 

HL: And presumably you’re still speaking with them both this week?

YV: I haven’t spoken to the Prime Minister this week, in the past couple of days, but I speak to Euclid, yes, and I consider Euclid to be very close to be, and vice-versa, and I don’t envy him at all. [Chuckling.]

 

HL: Would you be shocked if Tsipras resigned?

YV: Nothing shocks me these days – our Eurozone is a very inhospitable place for decent people. It wouldn’t shock me either to stay on and accepts a very bad deal. Because I can understand he feels he has an obligation to the people that support him, support us, not to let this country become a failed state.

But I’m not going to betray my own view, that I honed back in 2010, that this country must stop extending and pretending, we must stop taking on new loans pretending that we’ve solved the problem, when we haven’t; when we have made our debt even less sustainable on condition of further austerity that even further shrinks the economy; and shifts the burden further onto the have nots, creating a humanitarian crisis. It’s something I’m not going to accept. I’m not going to be party to.

 

HL: Final question – will you stay close with anyone who you had to negotiate with?

YV: Um, I’m not sure. I’m not going to mention any names now just in case I destroy their careers! [Laughing.]

Žižek: Kaj je še levo?

 

Was ist jetzt noch links?
In dieser Woche erleben wir einen Kampf um die demokratische Leitkultur. Es geht nicht um die Griechen. Es geht um uns alle! VON SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK
Die griechische Flagge vor einer Statue des Philosophen Sokrates in Athen
Die griechische Flagge vor einer Statue des Philosophen Sokrates in Athen | © Reuters/Yannis Behrakis
Ein bekannter Witz aus dem letzten Jahrzehnt der Sowjetunion handelt von Rabinowitsch, einem Juden, der auswandern will. Der Bürokrat im Auswanderungsamt fragt ihn nach dem Grund, und Rabinowitsch antwortet: “Es gibt zwei Gründe. Der erste ist, dass ich mich vor einem Machtverlust der Kommunisten in der Sowjetunion fürchte. Die neuen Machthaber könnten dann die kommunistischen Verbrechen allein uns, den Juden, in die Schuhe schieben – und es könnte wieder judenfeindliche Pogrome geben …” – “Aber”, unterbricht ihn der Bürokrat, “das ist totaler Unsinn, nichts kann sich in der Sowjetunion je ändern, die kommunistische Macht wird ewig währen!” “Tja”, entgegnet Rabinowitsch ruhig, “das ist mein zweiter Grund.”

In Athen kursiert derzeit eine neue Version dieses Witzes. Ein junger Grieche sucht das australische Konsulat in Athen auf und fragt nach einem Arbeitsvisum. “Warum wollen Sie Griechenland verlassen?”, fragt der Beamte. “Aus zwei Gründen”, antwortet der Grieche. “Erstens befürchte ich, dass Griechenland die EU verlassen wird, was zu noch mehr Armut und Chaos im Land führen wird …” – “Aber”, unterbricht ihn der Beamte, “das ist totaler Unsinn, Griechenland wird in der EU bleiben und sich der Finanzdisziplin unterwerfen!” – “Tja”, entgegnet der Grieche ruhig, “das ist mein zweiter Grund.”

Sind also beide Entscheidungen die schlechteren, um Stalin zu paraphrasieren? Der Moment ist gekommen, an dem wir die irrelevanten Debatten über mögliche Fehler und Fehlurteile der griechischen Regierung hinter uns lassen müssen. Inzwischen steht viel zu viel auf dem Spiel.

Die Tatsache, dass sich in den Verhandlungen zwischen Griechenland und den EU-Verwaltern eine Kompromissformel immer im allerletzten Moment verflüchtigt hat, ist an sich schon höchst bezeichnend. Es geht nicht mehr wirklich um finanzielle Meinungsverschiedenheiten – auf dieser Ebene unterscheiden sich die Positionen nur noch minimal. Die EU beschuldigt Griechenland in der Regel, lediglich Allgemeinplätze zu verbreiten und vage Versprechen ohne belastbare Details zu machen, während Griechenland der EU vorwirft, dass diese selbst kleinste Details zu kontrollieren versuche und dem Land Bedingungen auferlege, die noch rigoroser seien als die, die sie der Vorgängerregierung aufgebürdet habe.

Hinter diesen Vorhaltungen steckt jedoch ein ganz anderer, viel tieferer Konflikt. Der griechische Premier Alexis Tsipras bemerkte unlängst, wenn er sich allein mit Angela Merkel zum Abendessen träfe, hätten beide binnen zwei Stunden eine Lösung gefunden. Er wollte damit sagen, dass Merkel und er, zwei Politiker, den Streit als einen politischen behandeln würden, im Unterschied zu technokratischen Verwaltern wie dem Kopf der Euro-Gruppe, Jeroen Dijsselbloem. Wenn es in dieser ganzen Geschichte einen Bösewicht gibt, dann ist es Dijsselbloem mit seinem Motto: “Wenn ich die Dinge erst einmal von ihrer ideologischen Seite nehme, erreiche ich nichts mehr.”

Auch die EU-Technokraten folgen einer Ideologie – nur einer anderen

Damit kommen wir zur Krux des Ganzen: Tsipras und Varoufakis reden, als seien sie Teil eines offenen politischen Prozesses, in dem letztlich “ideologische” (auf normativen Präferenzen beruhende) Entscheidungen getroffen werden müssten. Die EU-Technokraten reden, als ob es sich bei alldem um eine Frage detaillierter regulatorischer Maßnahmen handelte, und wenn die Griechen diese Haltung ablehnen und grundsätzlichere politische Fragen aufwerfen, wirft man ihnen vor, sie würden lügen und sich vor konkreten Lösungen drücken. Die Wahrheit ist hier eindeutig auf der griechischen Seite: Dijsselbloems Verleugnung der “ideologischen Seite” ist Ideologie in Reinkultur, sie gibt Entscheidungen, die effektiv politisch-ideologisch begründet sind, fälschlich als Regulierungsmaßnahmen aus.

Dieser Artikel stammt aus der ZEIT Nr. 27 vom 02.07.2015.
Dieser Artikel stammt aus der ZEIT Nr. 27 vom 02.07.2015. | Die aktuelle ZEIT können Sie am Kiosk oder hier erwerben.
Aufgrund dieser Asymmetrie wirkt der “Dialog” zwischen Tsipras oder Varoufakis und ihren EU-Partnern oft wie das Gespräch zwischen einem jungen Studenten, der ernsthaft über Grundsatzfragen diskutieren möchte, und einem arroganten Professor, der diese Themen in seinen Antworten beschämenderweise ignoriert und den Studenten wegen technischer Mängel ausschilt: “Das ist nicht korrekt formuliert! Diese Regel haben Sie nicht berücksichtigt!” Oder gar wie der Wortwechsel zwischen einer vergewaltigten Frau, die verzweifelt berichten will, was ihr widerfahren ist, und einem Polizisten, der sie ständig mit Fragen nach bürokratischen Details unterbricht. Diese Umstellung von der eigentlichen Politik auf eine neutrale Expertenverwaltung zeichnet unseren gesamten politischen Prozess aus: Strategische, machtbasierte Entscheidungen werden zunehmend als administrative Regulierungen ausgegeben, die auf neutralem Expertenwissen beruhen sollen. Und sie werden immer öfter hinter verschlossenen Türen ausgehandelt und ohne demokratische Beteiligung durchgesetzt.

Was ist jetzt noch links?
Seite 3/3: Syriza will etwas Richtiges
Varoufakis wundert sich selbst über das Mysterium, dass Banken Geld nach Griechenland pumpten und mit einem klientelistischen Staat zusammenarbeiteten, obwohl sie genau wussten, wie es um diesen stand – ohne die stillschweigende Billigung des westlichen Establishments hätte sich Griechenland niemals so hoch verschulden können. Der Syriza-Regierung ist vollkommen bewusst, dass die Hauptbedrohung nicht aus Brüssel kommt – sie lauert in Griechenland selbst, dem Inbegriff eines klientelistischen, korrupten Staates.

Syriza will etwas Richtiges, das im bestehenden System nicht möglich ist

Europa (die EU-Bürokratie) muss sich den Vorwurf gefallen lassen, Griechenland für seine Korruption und Ineffizienz kritisiert und gleichzeitig mit der Nea Dimokratia just die politische Kraft unterstützt zu haben, die diese Korruption und Ineffizienz verkörperte. Der Syriza-Regierung geht es genau darum, diese systematische Blockade zu überwinden – man lese nur Varoufakis’ programmatische Erklärung im britischen Guardian, in der er das letztliche strategische Ziel seiner Partei beschreibt: “Ein griechischer oder ein portugiesischer oder ein italienischer Austritt aus der Euro-Zone würde bald zu einem Zerbrechen des europäischen Kapitalismus führen. Die Folge wäre eine ernsthaft rezessionsgefährdete Überschussregion östlich des Rheins und nördlich der Alpen, während das restliche Europa in einer brutalen Stagflation versänke. Wer würde wohl von dieser Entwicklung profitieren? Eine progressive Linke, die sich in den öffentlichen Institutionen Europas wie ein Phönix aus der Asche erhebt? Oder die Nazis der Goldenen Morgenröte, die diversen neofaschistischen Bewegungen, Fremdenfeinde und Ganoven? Ich habe nicht den geringsten Zweifel daran, wer von beiden am meisten von einem Zerfall der Euro-Zone profitieren würde. Ich für meinen Teil bin nicht bereit, frischen Wind in die Segel dieser postmodernen Version der 1930er Jahre zu bringen. Wenn das bedeutet, dass wir es sind, die angemessen unberechenbaren Marxisten, die versuchen müssen, den europäischen Kapitalismus vor sich selbst zu retten, dann sei’s drum. Nicht aus Liebe zum europäischen Kapitalismus, zur Euro-Zone, zu Brüssel oder zur Europäischen Zentralbank, sondern allein deshalb, weil wir die unnötigen menschlichen Kosten dieser Krise minimieren wollen.”

SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK
ist Philosoph und lehrt in London.
Die Finanzpolitik der Syriza-Regierung hat sich eng an die folgenden Grundsätze gehalten: Defizitvermeidung, strenge Finanzdisziplin, höhere Steuereinnahmen. Dennoch charakterisierten einige deutsche Medien Varoufakis jüngst als einen Psychotiker, der in seinem eigenen Sonderuniversum lebt – aber ist er wirklich so radikal? Was an Varoufakis so enerviert, ist nicht seine Radikalität, sondern seine vernünftige pragmatische Bescheidenheit. Bei näherer Betrachtung seiner Vorschläge muss einem unweigerlich auffallen, dass sie in Maßnahmen bestehen, die vor vierzig Jahren Teil des sozialdemokratischen Standardprogramms gewesen wären; die schwedischen Regierungen der 1960er Jahre etwa verfolgten weitaus radikalere Ziele. Es ist ein trauriges Zeichen unserer Zeit, dass man heutzutage der radikalen Linken angehören muss, um dieselben Mittel zu befürworten – ein Zeichen finsterer Zeiten, aber auch eine Chance für die Linke, den Raum zu besetzen, der vor einigen Jahrzehnten noch der der moderaten linken Mitte war.

Vielleicht aber geht dieses endlos wiederholte Argument, wie gemäßigt Syrizas Politik in Wirklichkeit sei, nämlich so wie die der guten alten Sozialdemokratie, am Ziel vorbei. Syriza ist faktisch gefährlich, die Partei stellt sehr wohl eine Bedrohung für die gegenwärtige Ausrichtung der EU dar – der globale Kapitalismus kann sich eine Rückkehr zum alten Wohlfahrtsstaat nicht leisten. Die Beschwichtigung über die Bescheidenheit von Syrizas Zielen ist also auch ein bisschen scheinheilig: Ihre Anhänger wollen effektiv etwas, das innerhalb der Koordinaten des bestehenden globalen Systems nicht möglich ist.

Hier gilt es, eine ernsthafte strategische Wahl zu treffen: Was, wenn der Moment gekommen ist, die Maske der Bescheidenheit fallen zu lassen und für einen wesentlich radikaleren Wandel einzutreten, einen Wandel, der nötig ist, um auch nur bescheidene Erfolge zu erzielen? Vielleicht ist das angekündigte Referendum der erste Schritt in diese Richtung.

Evropa je zmagala – Krugman o “OXI”

Europe Wins

Tsipras and Syriza have won big in the referendum, strengthening their hand for whatever comes next. But they’re not the only winners: I would argue that Europe, and the European idea, just won big — at least in the sense of dodging a bullet.

I know that’s not how most people see it. But think of it this way: we have just witnessed Greece stand up to a truly vile campaign of bullying and intimidation, an attempt to scare the Greek public, not just into accepting creditor demands, but into getting rid of their government. It was a shameful moment in modern European history, and would have set a truly ugly precedent if it had succeeded.

But it didn’t. You don’t have to love Syriza, or believe that they know what they’re doing — it’s not clear that they do, although the troika has been even worse — to believe that European institutions have just been saved from their own worst instincts. If Greece had been forced into line by financial fear mongering, Europe would have sinned in a way that would sully its reputation for generations. Instead, it’s something we can, perhaps, eventually regard as an aberration.

And if Greece ends up exiting the euro? There’s actually a pretty good case for Grexit now — and in any case, democracy matters more than any currency arrangement.

Mearsheimer: Zakaj je za ukrajinsko krizo kriv Zahod

Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault

The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin

John J. Mearsheimer

According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out o! a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest o! Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster o! Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part o! Ukraine. But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most o! the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot o! the trouble is “#$% enlargement, the central element o! a larger strategy to move Ukraine out o& Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the ‘(’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing o! the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine—beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004—were critical elements, too. Since the mid- 1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed “#$% enlargement and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow o! Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president—which he rightly labeled a “coup”—was the )nal straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a “#$% naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its e*orts to join the West. Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core John J. Mearsheimer 2 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a 0awed view o! international politics. They tend to believe that the logic o! realism holds little relevance in the twenty-)rst century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis o! such liberal principles as the rule o1 law, economic interdependence, and democracy. But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant—and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy. THE WESTERN AFFRONT As the Cold War came to a close, Soviet leaders preferred that U.S. forces remain in Europe and “#$% stay intact, an arrangement they thought would keep a reuni)ed Germany paci)ed. But they and their Russian successors did not want “#$% to grow any larger and assumed that Western diplomats understood their concerns. The Clinton administration evidently thought otherwise, and in the mid-1990s, it began pushing for “#$% to expand. The )rst round o! enlargement took place in 1999 and brought in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The second occurred in 2004; it included Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Moscow complained bitterly from the start. During “#$%’s 1995 bombing campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, for example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said, “This is the )rst sign o! what could happen when “#$% comes right up to the Russian Federation’s borders. . . . The 0ame o! war could burst out across the whole o& Europe.” But the Russians were too weak at the time to derail “#$%’s eastward movement—which, at any rate, did not look so threatening, since none o! the new members shared a border with Russia, save for the tiny Baltic countries. Then “#$% began looking further east. At its April 2008 summit in Bucharest, the alliance considered admitting Georgia and Ukraine. The George W. Bush administration supported doing so, but France and Germany opposed the move for fear that it would unduly antagonize Russia. In the end, “#$%’s members reached a compromise: the Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 3 alliance did not begin the formal process leading to membership, but it issued a statement endorsing the aspirations o! Georgia and Ukraine and boldly declaring, “These countries will become members o! “#$%.” Moscow, however, did not see the outcome as much o! a compromise. Alexander Grushko, then Russia’s deputy foreign minister, said, “Georgia’s and Ukraine’s membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.” Putin maintained that admitting those two countries to “#$% would represent a “direct threat” to Russia. One Russian newspaper reported that Putin, while speaking with Bush, “very transparently hinted that i! Ukraine was accepted into “#$%, it would cease to exist.” Russia’s invasion o! Georgia in August 2008 should have dispelled any remaining doubts about Putin’s determination to prevent Georgia and Ukraine from joining “#$%. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was deeply committed to bringing his country into “#$%, had decided in the summer o! 2008 to reincorporate two separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But Putin sought to keep Georgia weak and divided—and out o! “#$%. After )ghting broke out between the Georgian government and South Ossetian separatists, Russian forces took control o! Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow had made its point. Yet despite this clear warning, “#$% never publicly abandoned its goal o1 bringing Georgia and Ukraine into the alliance. And “#$% expansion continued marching forward, with Albania and Croatia becoming members in 2009. The ‘(, too, has been marching eastward. In May 2008, it unveiled its Eastern Partnership initiative, a program to foster prosperity in such countries as Ukraine and integrate them into the ‘( economy. Not surprisingly, Russian leaders view the plan as hostile to their country’s interests. This past February, before Yanukovych was forced from o2ce, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the ‘( o! trying to create a “sphere o! in0uence” in eastern Europe. In the eyes o& Russian leaders, ‘( expansion is a stalking horse for “#$% expansion. The West’s )nal tool for peeling Kiev away from Moscow has been U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. John J. Mearsheimer 4 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ its e*orts to spread Western values and promote democracy in Ukraine and other post-Soviet states, a plan that often entails funding pro- Western individuals and organizations. Victoria Nuland, the U.S. assistant secretary o! state for European and Eurasian a*airs, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves.” As part o! that e*ort, the U.S. government has bankrolled the National Endowment for Democracy. The nonpro)t foundation has funded more than 60 projects aimed at promoting civil society in Ukraine, and the “‘3’s president, Carl Gershman, has called that country “the biggest prize.” After Yanukovych won Ukraine’s presidential election in February 2010, the “‘3 decided he was undermining its goals, and so it stepped up its e*orts to support the opposition and strengthen the country’s democratic institutions. When Russian leaders look at Western social engineering in Ukraine, they worry that their country might be next. And such fears are hardly groundless. In September 2013, Gershman wrote in The Washington Post, “Ukraine’s choice to join Europe will accelerate the demise o! the ideology o& Russian imperialism that Putin represents.” He added: “Russians, too, face a choice, and Putin may )nd himsel! on the losing end not just in the near abroad but within Russia itself.”

CREATING A CRISIS

The West’s triple package o! policies—”#$% enlargement, ‘( expansion, and democracy promotion—added fuel to a )re waiting to ignite. The spark came in November 2013, when Yanukovych rejected a major economic deal he had been negotiating with the ‘( and decided to accept a $15 billion Russian countero*er instead. That decision gave rise to antigovernment demonstrations that escalated over the following three months and that by mid-February had led to the deaths o! some one hundred protesters. Western emissaries hurriedly 0ew to Kiev to resolve the crisis. On February 21, the government and the opposition struck a deal that allowed Yanukovych to stay in power until new elections were held. But it immediately fell apart, and Yanukovych 0ed to Russia the next day. The new government in Kiev was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core, and it contained four high-ranking members who could legitimately be labeled neofascists. Although the full extent o! U.S. involvement has not yet come to light, it is clear that Washington backed the coup. Nuland and RepubWhy the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 5 lican Senator John McCain participated in antigovernment demonstrations, and Geo*rey Pyatt, the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, proclaimed after Yanukovych’s toppling that it was “a day for the history books.” As a leaked telephone recording revealed, Nuland had advocated regime change and wanted the Ukrainian politician Arseniy Yatsenyuk to become prime minister in the new government, which he did. No wonder Russians o! all persuasions think the West played a role in Yanukovych’s ouster. For Putin, the time to act against Ukraine and the West had arrived. Shortly after February 22, he ordered Russian forces to take Crimea from Ukraine, and soon after that, he incorporated it into Russia. The task proved relatively easy, thanks to the thousands o! Russian troops already stationed at a naval base in the Crimean port o! Sevastopol. Crimea also made for an easy target since ethnic Russians compose roughly 60 percent o! its population. Most o! them wanted out o! Ukraine. Next, Putin put massive pressure on the new government in Kiev to discourage it from siding with the West against Moscow, making it clear that he would wreck Ukraine as a functioning state before he would allow it to become a Western stronghold on Russia’s doorstep. Toward that end, he has provided advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to the Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, who are pushing the country toward civil war. He has massed a large army on the Ukrainian border, threatening to invade i! the government cracks down on the rebels. And he has sharply raised the price o! the natural gas Russia sells to Ukraine and demanded payment for past exports. Putin is playing hardball. THE DIAGNOSIS Putin’s actions should be easy to comprehend. A huge expanse o& 0at land that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all crossed to strike at Russia itself, Ukraine serves as a bu*er state o! enormous strategic importance to Russia. No Russian leader would tolerate a military alliance that was Moscow’s mortal enemy until recently moving into Ukraine. Nor would any Russian leader stand idly by while the West helped install a government there that was determined to integrate Ukraine into the West. Washington may not like Moscow’s position, but it should understand the logic behind it. This is Geopolitics 101: great powers are John J. Mearsheimer 6 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ always sensitive to potential threats near their home territory. After all, the United States does not tolerate distant great powers deploying military forces anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, much less on its borders. Imagine the outrage in Washington i! China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Logic aside, Russian leaders have told their Western counterparts on many occasions that they consider “#$% expansion into Georgia and Ukraine unacceptable, along with any e*ort to turn those countries against Russia—a message that the 2008 Russian- Georgian war also made crystal clear. O2cials from the United States and its European allies contend that they tried hard to assuage Russian fears and that Moscow should understand that “#$% has no designs on Russia. In addition to continually denying that its expansion was aimed at containing Russia, the alliance has never permanently deployed military forces in its new member states. In 2002, it even created a body called the “#$%-Russia Council in an e*ort to foster cooperation. To further mollify Russia, the United States announced in 2009 that it would deploy its new missile defense system on warships in European waters, at least initially, rather than on Czech or Polish territory. But none o! these measures worked; the Russians remained steadfastly opposed to “#$% enlargement, especially into Georgia and Ukraine. And it is the Russians, not the West, who ultimately get to decide what counts as a threat to them. To understand why the West, especially the United States, failed to understand that its Ukraine policy was laying the groundwork for a major clash with Russia, one must go back to the mid-1990s, when the Clinton administration began advocating “#$% expansion. Pundits advanced a variety o! arguments for and against enlargement, but there was no consensus on what to do. Most eastern European émigrés in the United States and their relatives, for example, strongly supported expansion, because they wanted “#$% to protect such countries as Hungary and Poland. A few realists also favored the policy because they thought Russia still needed to be contained. But most realists opposed expansion, in the belie! that a declining Imagine the outrage if China built an impressive military alliance and tried to include Canada and Mexico in it. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 7 great power with an aging population and a one-dimensional economy did not in fact need to be contained. And they feared that enlargement would only give Moscow an incentive to cause trouble in eastern Europe. The U.S. diplomat George Kennan articulated this perspective in a 1998 interview, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved the )rst round o! “#$% expansion. “I think the Russians will gradually react quite adversely and it will a*ect their policies,” he said. “I think it is a tragic mistake. There was no reason for this whatsoever. No one was threatening anyone else.” Most liberals, on the other hand, favored enlargement, including many key members o! the Clinton administration. They believed that the end o! the Cold War had fundamentally transformed international politics and that a new, postnational order had replaced the realist logic that used to govern Europe. The United States was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary o! State Madeleine Albright put it; it was also a benign hegemon and thus unlikely to be viewed as a threat in Moscow. The aim, in essence, was to make the entire continent look like western Europe. And so the United States and its allies sought to promote democracy in the countries o! eastern Europe, increase economic interdependence among them, and embed them in international institutions. Having won the debate in the United States, liberals had little di2- culty convincing their European allies to support “#$% enlargement. After all, given the ‘(’s past achievements, Europeans were even more wedded than Americans to the idea that geopolitics no longer mattered and that an all-inclusive liberal order could maintain peace in Europe. So thoroughly did liberals come to dominate the discourse about European security during the )rst decade o! this century that even as the alliance adopted an open-door policy o! growth, “#$% expansion faced little realist opposition. The liberal worldview is now accepted dogma among U.S. o2cials. In March, for example, President Barack Obama delivered a speech about Ukraine in which he talked repeatedly about “the ideals” that motivate Western policy and how those ideals “have often been threatened by an older, more traditional view o! power.” Secretary o! State John Kerry’s response to the Crimea crisis re0ected this same perspective: “You just don’t in the twenty- )rst century behave in nineteenth-century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped-up pretext.” John J. Mearsheimer 8 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ In essence, the two sides have been operating with di*erent playbooks: Putin and his compatriots have been thinking and acting according to realist dictates, whereas their Western counterparts have been adhering to liberal ideas about international politics. The result is that the United States and its allies unknowingly provoked a major crisis over Ukraine. BLAME GAME In that same 1998 interview, Kennan predicted that “#$% expansion would provoke a crisis, after which the proponents o! expansion would “say that we always told you that is how the Russians are.” As i! on cue, most Western o2cials have portrayed Putin as the real culprit in the Ukraine predicament. In March, according to The New York Times, German Chancellor Angela Merkel implied that Putin was irrational, telling Obama that he was “in another world.” Although Putin no doubt has autocratic tendencies, no evidence supports the charge that he is mentally unbalanced. On the contrary: he is a )rst-class strategist who should be feared and respected by anyone challenging him on foreign policy. Other analysts allege, more plausibly, that Putin regrets the demise o! the Soviet Union and is determined to reverse it by expanding Russia’s borders. According to this interpretation, Putin, having taken Crimea, is now testing the waters to see i! the time is right to conquer Ukraine, or at least its eastern part, and he will eventually behave aggressively toward other countries in Russia’s neighborhood. For some in this camp, Putin represents a modern-day Adol& Hitler, and striking any kind o! deal with him would repeat the mistake o& Munich. Thus, “#$% must admit Georgia and Ukraine to contain Russia before it dominates its neighbors and threatens western Europe. This argument falls apart on close inspection. I& Putin were committed to creating a greater Russia, signs o1 his intentions would almost certainly have arisen before February 22. But there is virtually no evidence that he was bent on taking Crimea, much less any other territory in Ukraine, before that date. Even Western leaders who supported “#$% expansion were not doing so out o! a fear that Russia was about to use military force. Putin’s actions in Crimea took them by complete surprise and appear to have been a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovych’s ouster. Right afterward, even Putin said he opposed Crimean secession, before quickly changing his mind. Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 9 Besides, even i! it wanted to, Russia lacks the capability to easily conquer and annex eastern Ukraine, much less the entire country. Roughly 15 million people—one-third o! Ukraine’s population—live between the Dnieper River, which bisects the country, and the Russian border. An overwhelming majority o! those people want to remain part o! Ukraine and would surely resist a Russian occupation. Furthermore, Russia’s mediocre army, which shows few signs o! turning into a modern Wehrmacht, would have little chance o! pacifying all o! Ukraine. Moscow is also poorly positioned to pay for a costly occupation; its weak economy would su*er even more in the face o! the resulting sanctions. But even i& Russia did boast a powerful military machine and an impressive economy, it would still probably prove unable to successfully occupy Ukraine. One need only consider the Soviet and U.S. experiences in Afghanistan, the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq, and the Russian experience in Chechnya to be reminded that military occupations usually end badly. Putin surely understands that trying to subdue Ukraine would be like swallowing a porcupine. His response to events there has been defensive, not o*ensive.

A WAY OUT

Given that most Western leaders continue to deny that Putin’s behavior might be motivated by legitimate security concerns, it is unsurprising that they have tried to modify it by doubling down on their existing policies and have punished Russia to deter further aggression. Although Kerry has maintained that “all options are on the table,” neither the United States nor its “#$% allies are prepared to use force to defend Ukraine. The West is relying instead on economic sanctions to coerce Russia into ending its support for the insurrection in eastern Ukraine. In July, the United States and the ‘( put in place their third round o1 limited sanctions, targeting mainly high-level individuals closely tied to the Russian government and some high-pro- )le banks, energy companies, and defense )rms. They also threatened to unleash another, tougher round o! sanctions, aimed at whole sectors o! the Russian economy. Such measures will have little e*ect. Harsh sanctions are likely o* the table anyway; western European countries, especially Germany, have resisted imposing them for fear that Russia might retaliate and cause serious economic damage within the ‘(. But even i! the United John J. Mearsheimer 10 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ States could convince its allies to enact tough measures, Putin would probably not alter his decision-making. History shows that countries will absorb enormous amounts o! punishment in order to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule. Western leaders have also clung to the provocative policies that precipitated the crisis in the )rst place. In April, U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden met with Ukrainian legislators and told them, “This is a second opportunity to make good on the original promise made by the Orange Revolution.” John Brennan, the director o! the 4-#, did not help things when, that same month, he visited Kiev on a trip the White House said was aimed at improving security cooperation with the Ukrainian government. The ‘(, meanwhile, has continued to push its Eastern Partnership. In March, José Manuel Barroso, president o! the European Commission, summarized ‘( thinking on Ukraine, saying, “We have a debt, a duty o! solidarity with that country, and we will work to have them as close as possible to us.” And sure enough, on June 27, the ‘( and Ukraine signed the economic agreement that Yanukovych had fatefully rejected seven months earlier. Also in June, at a meeting o! “#$% members’ foreign ministers, it was agreed that the alliance would remain open to new members, although the foreign ministers refrained from mentioning Ukraine by name. “No third country has a veto over “#$% enlargement,” announced Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “#$%’s secretary- general. The foreign ministers also agreed to support various measures to improve Ukraine’s military capabilities in such areas as command and control, logistics, and cyberdefense. Russian leaders have naturally recoiled at these actions; the West’s response to the crisis will only make a bad situation worse. There is a solution to the crisis in Ukraine, however—although it would require the West to think about the country in a fundamentally new way. The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral bu*er between “#$% and Russia, akin to Austria’s position during the Cold War. Western leaders should acknowledge that Ukraine matters so much to Putin that they cannot support an anti-Russian regime there. This would not mean that a future Ukrainian government would have to be pro-Russian or anti-“#$%. On the contrary, the goal should be a sovereign Ukraine that falls in neither the Russian nor the Western Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault September/October 2014 11 camp. To achieve this end, the United States and its allies should publicly rule out “#$%’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine. The West should also help fashion an economic rescue plan for Ukraine funded jointly by the ‘(, the International Monetary Fund, Russia, and the United States—a proposal that Moscow should welcome, given its interest in having a prosperous and stable Ukraine on its western 0ank. And the West should considerably limit its social-engineering e*orts inside Ukraine. It is time to put an end to Western support for another Orange Revolution. Nevertheless, U.S. and European leaders should encourage Ukraine to respect minority rights, especially the language rights o! its Russian speakers. Some may argue that changing policy toward Ukraine at this late date would seriously damage U.S. credibility around the world. There would undoubtedly be certain costs, but the costs o! continuing a misguided strategy would be much greater. Furthermore, other countries are likely to respect a state that learns from its mistakes and ultimately devises a policy that deals e*ectively with the problem at hand. That option is clearly open to the United States. One also hears the claim that Ukraine has the right to determine whom it wants to ally with and the Russians have no right to prevent Kiev from joining the West. This is a dangerous way for Ukraine to think about its foreign policy choices. The sad truth is that might often makes right when great-power politics are at play. Abstract rights such as self-determination are largely meaningless when powerful states get into brawls with weaker states. Did Cuba have the right to form a military alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cold War? The United States certainly did not think so, and the Russians think the same way about Ukraine joining the West. It is in Ukraine’s interest to understand these facts o1 life and tread carefully when dealing with its more powerful neighbor. Even i! one rejects this analysis, however, and believes that Ukraine has the right to petition to join the ‘( and “#$%, the fact remains that the United States and its European allies have the right to reject these requests. There is no reason that the West has to accommodate The United States and its allies should abandon their plan to westernize Ukraine and instead aim to make it a neutral bu!er. John J. Mearsheimer 12 +%,’-.” #++#-,/ Ukraine i! it is bent on pursuing a wrong-headed foreign policy, especially i! its defense is not a vital interest for them. Indulging the dreams o! some Ukrainians is not worth the animosity and strife it will cause, especially for the Ukrainian people. O! course, some analysts might concede that “#$% handled relations with Ukraine poorly and yet still maintain that Russia constitutes an enemy that will only grow more formidable over time—and that the West therefore has no choice but to continue its present policy. But this viewpoint is badly mistaken. Russia is a declining power, and it will only get weaker with time. Even i& Russia were a rising power, moreover, it would still make no sense to incorporate Ukraine into “#$%. The reason is simple: the United States and its European allies do not consider Ukraine to be a core strategic interest, as their unwillingness to use military force to come to its aid has proved. It would therefore be the height o& folly to create a new “#$% member that the other members have no intention o! defending. N#$% has expanded in the past because liberals assumed the alliance would never have to honor its new security guarantees, but Russia’s recent power play shows that granting Ukraine “#$% membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course. Sticking with the current policy would also complicate Western relations with Moscow on other issues. The United States needs Russia’s assistance to withdraw U.S. equipment from Afghanistan through Russian territory, reach a nuclear agreement with Iran, and stabilize the situation in Syria. In fact, Moscow has helped Washington on all three o! these issues in the past; in the summer o! 2013, it was Putin who pulled Obama’s chestnuts out o! the )re by forging the deal under which Syria agreed to relinquish its chemical weapons, thereby avoiding the U.S. military strike that Obama had threatened. The United States will also someday need Russia’s help containing a rising China. Current U.S. policy, however, is only driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. The United States and its European allies now face a choice on Ukraine. They can continue their current policy, which will exacerbate hostilities with Russia and devastate Ukraine in the process—a scenario in which everyone would come out a loser. Or they can switch gears and work to create a prosperous but neutral Ukraine, one that does not threaten Russia and allows the West to repair its relations with Moscow. With that approach, all sides would win.!

Stiglitz: Poslednje dejanje Evropske unije

[Joseph E. Stiglitz]

European Union’s last act?

Published : 2015-06-08 19:20
Updated : 2015-06-08 20:02

The European Union leaders continue to play a game of brinkmanship with the Greek government. Greece has met its creditors’ demands far more than halfway. Yet Germany and Greece’s other creditors continue to demand that the country sign on to a program that has proven to be a failure, and that few economists ever thought could, would or should be implemented.

The swing in Greece’s fiscal position from a large primary deficit to a surplus was almost unprecedented, but the demand that the country achieve a primary surplus of 4.5 percent of gross domestic product was unconscionable. Unfortunately, at the time that the “troika” ― the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund ― first included this irresponsible demand in the international financial program for Greece, the country’s authorities had no choice but to accede to it.


The folly of continuing to pursue this program is particularly acute now, given the 25 percent decline in GDP that Greece has endured since the beginning of the crisis. The troika badly misjudged the macroeconomic effects of the program that they imposed. According to their published forecasts, they believed that, by cutting wages and accepting other austerity measures, Greek exports would increase and the economy would quickly return to growth. They also believed that the first debt restructuring would lead to debt sustainability.

The troika’s forecasts have been wrong, and repeatedly so. And not by a little, but by an enormous amount. Greece’s voters were right to demand a change in course, and their government is right to refuse to sign on to a deeply flawed program.

Having said that, there is room for a deal: Greece has made clear its willingness to engage in continued reforms and has welcomed Europe’s help in implementing some of them. A dose of reality on the part of Greece’s creditors ― about what is achievable, and about the macroeconomic consequences of different fiscal and structural reforms ― could provide the basis of an agreement that would be good not only for Greece, but for all of Europe.

Some in Europe, especially in Germany, seem nonchalant about a Greek exit from the eurozone. The market has, they claim, already “priced in” such a rupture. Some even suggest that it would be good for the monetary union.

I believe that such views significantly underestimate both the current and future risks involved. A similar degree of complacency was evident in the United States before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The fragility of America’s banks had been known for a long time ― at least since the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns the previous March. Yet, given the lack of transparency (owing in part to weak regulation), both markets and policymakers did not fully appreciate the linkages among financial institutions.

Indeed, the world’s financial system is still feeling the aftershocks of the Lehman collapse. And banks remain non-transparent and, thus, at risk. We still don’t know the full extent of linkages among financial institutions, including those arising from non-transparent derivatives and credit default swaps.

In Europe, we can already see some of the consequences of inadequate regulation and the flawed design of the eurozone itself. We know that the structure of the eurozone encourages divergence, not convergence: as capital and talented people leave crisis-hit economies, these countries become less able to repay their debts. As markets grasp that a vicious downward spiral is structurally embedded in the euro, the consequences for the next crisis become profound. And another crisis is inevitable: it is in the very nature of capitalism.

ECB President Mario Draghi’s confidence trick, in the form of his declaration in 2012 that the monetary authorities would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro, has worked so far. But the knowledge that the euro is not a binding commitment among its members will make it far less likely to work the next time. Bond yields could spike, and no amount of reassurance by the ECB and Europe’s leaders would suffice to bring them down from stratospheric levels, because the world now knows that they will not do “whatever it takes.” As the example of Greece has shown, they will do only what short-sighted electoral politics demands.

The most important consequence, I fear, is the weakening of European solidarity. The euro was supposed to strengthen it. Instead, it has had the opposite effect.

It is not in the interest of Europe ― or the world ― to have a country on Europe’s periphery alienated from its neighbors, especially now, when geopolitical instability is already so evident. The neighboring Middle East is in turmoil; the West is attempting to contain a newly aggressive Russia; and China, already the world’s largest source of savings, the largest trading country and the largest overall economy (in terms of purchasing power parity), is confronting the West with new economic and strategic realities. This is no time for European disunion.

Europe’s leaders viewed themselves as visionaries when they created the euro. They thought they were looking beyond the short-term demands that usually preoccupy political leaders.

Unfortunately, their understanding of economics fell short of their ambition; and the politics of the moment did not permit the creation of the institutional framework that might have enabled the euro to work as intended. Although the single currency was supposed to bring unprecedented prosperity, it is difficult to detect a significant positive effect for the eurozone as a whole in the period before the crisis. In the period since, the adverse effects have been enormous.

The future of Europe and the euro now depends on whether the eurozone’s political leaders can combine a modicum of economic understanding with a visionary sense of, and concern for, European solidarity. We are likely to begin finding out the answer to that existential question in the next few weeks.

By Joseph E. Stiglitz

Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate in economics, is the university professor at Columbia university. His most recent book, coauthored with Bruce Greenwald, is “Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, and Social Progress.” ― Ed.

Kaj je slovenska glasba? Prispevek k razpravi

 

Nekoč, na primer, so se bili spoprijeli zaradi vprašanja, kako da je izreči krvavo geslo: »Vse zbil!« Nekateri v kotu so kratkomalo zahtevali, da je treba govoriti, kakor je napi­sano: »Vse zbilj!« Drugi so ugovarjali; treba da je reči: »Vse zbou!« Nekdo se je celo oglasil s svojo posebno mo­drostjo: »Vse zbiv!« To imenitno vprašanje še nikakor ni bilo razrešeno, ko so načeli že drugo: če bi, na primer, pisali fonetično, ali naj bi tedaj pisali »vse zbou«, ali »vse zbov«; oziroma »vse zbiv«, ali »vse zbiu«. Toliko, da ni prišlo do hudega tepeža; vprašanje samo pa je obtičalo tam, kjer tiči dandanašnji.

 

V drugem kotu so ob taistem času onegavili mnogo višji problem. Če je namreč gledališka umetnost nujno potrebna za blagor človeštva; in če je, čemu da je. Na koncu je ostalo sredi staje tisto, kar ostane ob rešetanju vsakega kulturnega vprašanja: smrdeč kupček hinavščine. In iz kupčka, tega smrdečega, zraste nov problem: kdo da ga je bil naredil.

 

Spisal Ivan Cankar.

Izbral in priobčil Igor Koršič.

Tu spodaj sta začetek in konec te diagnoze debat v dolini. Žal ne samo kulturniških.

Objavljena je bila  pod naslovom Tišina.

 

Družba je bila, od vseh strani z visoko mejo zastražena, sama vase in v svojo malost zamaknjena; otroci v otroškem vrtcu, piščanci v kurniku. Sonce je sijalo tako prečudežno, da je dala bolha velikansko senco; in kobilica je bila masto­dont. Kdor jih gleda sedaj, resne, starikave, čeljustave, ime­nitno stopicajoče, kričave in jokave pritlikavce, se mu zdi, da bere povesti Gulliverjeve.

 

Klepetanje klep na klep. Kolikor tesna je staja, vendar je kotov in kotičkov brez števila; in vsak kot je zase globus. Človek bi rekel, da gleda spako sveta, gleda utelešen para­dokson: vesoljnost v orehovi lupini, kajti vse do fermenta je bilo tam po kotih, ničesar ni manjkalo: ozka in široka po­litika, domače novice, razne stvari, drobiž in zgodbe za kratek čas, na grobo izmišljeni telegrami, civilizacija od fraka do irhastih hlač, diletantizem in umetnost, obadva v vseh svojih pisanih oblikah, človeško znanje od analfabetskih poljan do jezuitskih višav, zamišljena bogovernost, godrnjav skepticizem in vnebovpijoče framasonstvo, modrost od Pla­tona do Brenceljna, čednosti vse, kolikor si jih je Bog bil izmislil v svoji neskončni dobrotljivosti, bratstvo brez kraja, popustljivost do samoponižanja, blagodarnost do beračenja, zvestoba do histerije, zaupljivost do naivnosti in čisto zraven nezaupljivost do paranoje, hudobnost vsa, kakor jo je bil v bolečini porodil ter nato v svoji grenki prešernosti legijon­krat razcepil satirik Satan Sam, zakrknjena samopašnost, smehljajoča hinavščina, krivogleda zavidnost, hropeče ži­valstvo, tankoglasa pohotnost, sramežljivo izdajalstvo in na prste študirana mladinska poezija. Vse do fermenta.

(Tu se je nahajal izbrani odlomek.)

Perspektiva je bila v tej družbi ob vso pravico in veljavo. Blizu ali daleč, veliko ali malo, važno ali nevažno, teh pojmov ni bilo. Ali pa vsaj merila ni bilo nikakšnega. Po­topila se je ladja, z njo tisoč in več ljudi; to je bila važna stvar. Zgodi se časih, da ugleda človek nenadoma svojo senco na zidu, spačeno, silno in strahotno; preplašen zaokrene korak in senca se mu ponižna in majhna smehlja ob stopalu. Zgodi se časih; v staji se je godilo zmerom. Dogodek, ki bi ga navaden človek, takorekoč, ne ošinil s kotom očesa, je planil v družbo strašen kakor volk med ovce, da se je beke­taje strnila in razbegnila. Beketali so, dokler se niso utrujeni spogledali ter molče ustanovili, da niso pribeketali ni zrna soli. Navsezgodaj so kričali vsako jutro po senzaciji, kakor

lačen otrok po mleku; in senzacija je prišla, ker je morala priti, visoka, črna in koščena, kakor Kamila med Slovence.

 

Kar je bilo v tej družbi zares in vselej važno, je bila važnost sama, važnost kot taka. Karkoli je obsenčila, se je ogromno zavalilo pred oči in na duše, da je sapa ledenela pred odprtimi šobami. Tako se da razložiti čudna prikazen, da se je iznenada v brezdanjo noč zvrnila stvar, še predno je bila dodobrega obmeketana in da se je na njeno mesto kar nasilno, samovoljno in pljuskoma postavila druga. Če je imela važnost ob takšnih svojih kapricah kakšne posebne sazloge in naklepe, ne vem; meni in vam ostanejo skriti na vekomej.

 

Primerilo se je mnogokdaj pod večer, da je klepetanje utihnilo. Pod žaltavo odejo vsakdanjosti se je vzdramil čist spomin na čase, ki so bili, se je zgenila slutnja časov, ki bodo. Oglasila se je pesem, mehka in mila in žalostna, pa vsa polna zaupanja in vere. Globoko in strašno je bilo močvirje, da je tolika lepota vzklila iz njega.

 

»Je pa davi slanca pala . . .«

 

Mirnejša_so lica, dihnil je bil nanje sijaj božje dobrotlji­vosti. Ena sama pesem, drobna kakor ščinkovec, je lahkotno premagala ogromnost nizkote, črno pezo bolečine, dušečo tesnobo staje, vzdignila se vriskaje k nebesom. Iz mrtvih oči je pogledala duša, izkazala je, da je.-

Alarm!

Klepetanje, prerekanje, gramatika; filozofija, umetnost, Kamila, zaupljivost, ljubezen, nizkotnost, pesem, življenje, duša, ničesar več. Tišina tolika, da ni čuti utripanja src. Edino, kar je še ostalo, je občutek brezmejnega ponižanja, nezaslišane smešnosti, grenki, neznosni občutek lastne ma­losti in nemoči.

 

Zdajle si najbrž kdo misli, da sem nameraval načeti zgodovino »celice št. 4.«. Napisal pa sem le nahitro, kako je živel slovenski narod vse do avgusta meseca leta 1914.

Krugmana glas v puščavi

Weimar on the Aegean
Try to talk about the policies we need in a depressed world economy, and someone is sure to counter with the specter of Weimar Germany, supposedly an object lesson in the dangers of budget deficits and monetary expansion. But the history of Germany after World War I is almost always cited in a curiously selective way. We hear endlessly about the hyperinflation of 1923, when people carted around wheelbarrows full of cash, but we never hear about the much more relevant deflation of the early 1930s, as the government of Chancellor Brüning — having learned the wrong lessons — tried to defend Germany’s peg to gold with tight money and harsh austerity.

And what about what happened before the hyperinflation, when the victorious Allies tried to force Germany to pay huge reparations? That’s also a tale with a lot of modern relevance, because it has a direct bearing on the crisis now brewing over Greece.

The point is that now, more than ever, it is crucial that Europe’s leaders remember the right history. If they don’t, the European project of peace and democracy through prosperity will not survive.

About those reparations: The basic story here is that Britain and France, instead of viewing the newly established German democracy as a potential partner, treated it as a conquered enemy, demanding that it make up their own wartime losses. This was deeply unwise — and the demands placed on Germany were impossible to meet, for two reasons. First, Germany’s economy had already been devastated by the war. Second, the true burden on that shrunken economy would — as John Maynard Keynes explained in his angry, powerful book “The Economic Consequences of the Peace” — be far greater than the direct payments to the vengeful Allies.

In the end, and inevitably, the actual sums collected from Germany fell far short of Allied demands. But the attempt to levy tribute on a ruined nation — incredibly, France actually invaded and occupied the Ruhr, Germany’s industrial heartland, in an effort to extract payment — crippled German democracy and poisoned relations with its neighbors.

Which brings us to the confrontation between Greece and its creditors.

You can argue that Greece brought its problems on itself, although it had a lot of help from irresponsible lenders. At this point, however, the simple fact is that Greece cannot pay its debts in full. Austerity has devastated its economy as thoroughly as military defeat devastated Germany — real Greek G.D.P. per capita fell 26 percent from 2007 to 2013, compared with a German decline of 29 percent from 1913 to 1919.

Despite this catastrophe, Greece is making payments to its creditors, running a primary surplus — an excess of revenue over spending other than interest — of around 1.5 percent of G.D.P. And the new Greek government is willing to keep running that surplus. What it is not willing to do is meet creditor demands that it triple the surplus, and keep running huge surpluses for many years to come.

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What would happen if Greece were to try to generate those huge surpluses? It would have to further slash government spending — but that wouldn’t be the end of the story. Spending cuts have already driven Greece into a deep depression, and further cuts would make that depression deeper. Falling incomes would, however, mean falling tax receipts, so that the deficit would decline by much less than the initial reduction in spending — probably less than half as much. To meet its target, then, Greece would have to do another round of cuts, and then another.

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Athanassios Tolis 33 minutes ago
Falling incomes would NOT mean falling tax receipts for the simple reason that at the present time all income comes straight from government…
Jon Champs 46 minutes ago
It is incorrect to paint Britain as the one treating Germany as conquered after WW1 – it tried hard to stop Clemenceau taking the path of…
James 1 hour ago
GDP of Greece is less than the state of Indiana, Greece has been a resource poor nation since the Bronze Age but intellectually and…
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Furthermore, a shrinking economy would lead to falling private spending too — another, indirect cost of the austerity.

Put it all together, and attempting to cough up the extra 3 percent of G.D.P. the creditors are demanding would cost Greece not 3 percent, but something like 8 percent of G.D.P. And remember, this would come on top of one of the worst economic slumps in history.

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What would happen if Greece were simply to refuse to pay? Well, 21st-century European nations don’t use their armies as bill collectors. But there are other forms of coercion. We now know that in 2010 the European Central Bank threatened, in effect, to collapse the Irish banking system unless Dublin agreed to an International Monetary Fund program.

The threat of something similar hangs implicitly over Greece, although my hope is that the central bank, which is under different and more open-minded management these days, wouldn’t go along.

In any case, European creditors should realize that flexibility — giving Greece a chance to recover — is in their own interests. They may not like the new leftist government, but it’s a duly elected government whose leaders are, from everything I’ve heard, sincerely committed to democratic ideals. Europe could do a lot worse — and if the creditors are vengeful, it will.

Varufakis in Kant. In Mramor?

Yanis Varoufakis: No Time for Games in Europe

ATHENS — I am writing this piece on the margins of a crucial negotiation with my country’s creditors — a negotiation the result of which may mark a generation, and even prove a turning point for Europe’s unfolding experiment with monetary union.

Game theorists analyze negotiations as if they were split-a-pie games involving selfish players. Because I spent many years during my previous life as an academic researching game theory, some commentators rushed to presume that as Greece’s new finance minister I was busily devising bluffs, stratagems and outside options, struggling to improve upon a weak hand.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

If anything, my game-theory background convinced me that it would be pure folly to think of the current deliberations between Greece and our partners as a bargaining game to be won or lost via bluffs and tactical subterfuge.

The trouble with game theory, as I used to tell my students, is that it takes for granted the players’ motives. In poker or blackjack this assumption is unproblematic. But in the current deliberations between our European partners and Greece’s new government, the whole point is to forge new motives. To fashion a fresh mind-set that transcends national divides, dissolves the creditor-debtor distinction in favor of a pan-European perspective, and places the common European good above petty politics, dogma that proves toxic if universalized, and an us-versus-them mind-set.

As finance minister of a small, fiscally stressed nation lacking its own central bank and seen by many of our partners as a problem debtor, I am convinced that we have one option only: to shun any temptation to treat this pivotal moment as an experiment in strategizing and, instead, to present honestly the facts concerning Greece’s social economy, table our proposals for regrowing Greece, explain why these are in Europe’s interest, and reveal the red lines beyond which logic and duty prevent us from going.

The great difference between this government and previous Greek governments is twofold: We are determined to clash with mighty vested interests in order to reboot Greece and gain our partners’ trust. We are also determined not to be treated as a debt colony that should suffer what it must. The principle of the greatest austerity for the most depressed economy would be quaint if it did not cause so much unnecessary suffering.

I am often asked: What if the only way you can secure funding is to cross your red lines and accept measures that you consider to be part of the problem, rather than of its solution? Faithful to the principle that I have no right to bluff, my answer is: The lines that we have presented as red will not be crossed. Otherwise, they would not be truly red, but merely a bluff.

But what if this brings your people much pain? I am asked. Surely you must be bluffing.

The problem with this line of argument is that it presumes, along with game theory, that we live in a tyranny of consequences. That there are no circumstances when we must do what is right not as a strategy but simply because it is … right.

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Against such cynicism the new Greek government will innovate. We shall desist, whatever the consequences, from deals that are wrong for Greece and wrong for Europe. The “extend and pretend” game that began after Greece’s public debt became unserviceable in 2010 will end. No more loans — not until we have a credible plan for growing the economy in order to repay those loans, help the middle class get back on its feet and address the hideous humanitarian crisis. No more “reform” programs that target poor pensioners and family-owned pharmacies while leaving large-scale corruption untouched.

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Jim Verdonik 21 minutes ago
Greece is just a deadbeat and should be treated accordingly.One difference from when Greece first got it’s bailout is that no one cares now…
maTTinATLanta 22 minutes ago
Exactly.For the time being, it amounts to German (European) pensioners paying their Greek compatriots. But that ship has sailed!Especially…
Thekla De Rango 22 minutes ago
Mr Varoufakis, you have set the benchmark high! A Finance Minister who is not only eloquent, but knowledgeable of economics, compassionate…
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Our government is not asking our partners for a way out of repaying our debts. We are asking for a few months of financial stability that will allow us to embark upon the task of reforms that the broad Greek population can own and support, so we can bring back growth and end our inability to pay our dues.

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One may think that this retreat from game theory is motivated by some radical-left agenda. Not so. The major influence here is Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher who taught us that the rational and the free escape the empire of expediency by doing what is right.

How do we know that our modest policy agenda, which constitutes our red line, is right in Kant’s terms? We know by looking into the eyes of the hungry in the streets of our cities or contemplating our stressed middle class, or considering the interests of hard-working people in every European village and city within our monetary union. After all, Europe will only regain its soul when it regains the people’s trust by putting their interests center-stage.

Yanis Varoufakis is the finance minister of Greece